Intimate Strangers by Walsum, S.K. van
 Honoured Rector, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The title of this talk, Intimate Strangers, is also the English title given to a 
French movie, directed by Patrice Leconte: Confidences trop intimes. That 
movie is about two people who meet by accident as complete strangers, and 
subsequently became intimately involved with each other. I wish to talk to you 
today about a reverse process: how people who are intimately related can be 
designated as strangers by nationality and migration law, and what this implies 
for their mutual relationship. 
I want to start with an example that shows how intimacy and the divide 
between citizen and stranger can intersect, and how problematic and unstable 
such points of intersection can be. I shall subsequently place that example in an 
historical context, to give more profile to the normative issues that current Dutch 
migration policies raise, and explain why I believe these are urgent. I shall then 
explore these issues on a more theoretical level, with the help of a couple of 
images, in search of an alternative perspective. I shall end by presenting my 
research plans for the coming years. But let me start by introducing you to an 
intimate stranger: John. 
 
John: an intimate stranger 
John was born in 1969 in the Hague, the son of a Dutch mother and an 
American father. When he was eight years old, the family moved to the States, 
where John went to high school and college as well. In 1991 his parents returned 
to the Hague, and John followed a year later at the age of twenty-three.  
At the time of John’s birth, Dutch nationality could only be passed on by a 
Dutch father, not by a Dutch mother. Preserving the unity of the family was at 
the time a guiding principle of Dutch nationality law – and migration law as 
well. The dominant assumption was that family unity could best be achieved by 
having the entire family share in the nationality of its male head. Although 
Dutch women no longer automatically lost their Dutch nationality upon 
marrying a foreigner, their children were still assumed to bear their father’s 
foreign nationality, and not her Dutch one. Conversely, if a foreign woman 
married a Dutchman, she could acquire his Dutch nationality simply by signing 
a declaration to that effect, and any children born out of that marriage 
automatically acquired their father’s Dutch nationality.1
This gendered logic stood under pressure however. The second feminist 
wave was well under way by the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, and Dutch 
mothers were claiming the right to pass on their nationality on the same basis as 
  
                                                 
1 B. De Hart, Onbezonnen vrouwen. Gemengde relaties in het nationaliteitsrecht en het 
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Dutch fathers. In December 1984 Dutch nationality law was reformed, and from 
then on, all children born of a Dutch parent received their Dutch parent’s 
nationality, regardless of whether that parent was their father or their mother.2 
For children like John however, born before 1985, the old rule still applied. 
Dutch mothers were offered the opportunity to have their minor children 
naturalised, but they had to apply before 1 January 1988.3
By then, he  had fallen in love with a Dutch woman, and fathered a Dutch 
child. But although his Dutch partner earned enough to meet the set income 
requirements, her contract was for less than the required year. Her employer did 
promise to extend her contract, but when he unexpectedly went bankrupt, John’s 
chances of acquiring legal status suddenly evaporated. So there he was. Born 
and bred in the Netherlands, a native Dutch speaker, the son of a Dutch mother, 
with a Dutch partner and child – whom he could only support as an 
undocumented migrant worker. Well, some might sigh, one has to draw the line 
somewhere, and to be honest – they would have a point. I shall get back to that 
later. But now let me continue my story. 
 John’s mother lived 
on the East Coast of the United States at the time. She was married to an 
academic and was well educated herself. Yet, like many other Dutch mothers, 
she remained unaware of these developments in Dutch nationality law. When 
John followed his parents to the Hague in 1992, he was still an American and by 
then it was too late to apply for Dutch nationality. John quickly found a job in 
Amsterdam with an English language bookstore. However the Dutch authorities 
refused to give his employer a work-permit, and in the end John was forced to 
leave his job.  
John and his partner managed to cope, largely thanks to the baby-sitting 
and financial support provided by John’s Dutch mother and legally resident 
American father. And then, in 2010, Dutch nationality law changed, making it 
possible for people born before 1985 of a Dutch mother and a foreign father,  to 
opt for Dutch nationality after all.4 John was one of the first to do so. Apparently 
the Dutch government was no longer worried about “an incalculably large 
number of aliens” making use of this port of entry into the Dutch nation, as it 
had in the 1980’s.5
 
 We in the Netherlands have finally gotten used to the idea 
that the child of a Dutch mother is as Dutch as that of a Dutch father.  
Current family migration policies in the Netherlands 
John’s story has a happy end, but this doesn’t mean the tension between 
intimacy and alienage has been resolved in Dutch migration law. The explicitly 
gendered distinctions of the past have given way to new ones that, in their own 
way, create situations as painful and absurd as what John and his family 
                                                 
2 Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap 1984, Staatsblad, 1984, nr 628. 
3 Art.27, sub 2 Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap 1984. 
4 Staatsblad 2010, nr. 242. 
5 Kamerstukken II 1982/83, 16 947, nr. 7, p. 33 (MvA) 
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experienced in the not so distant past. I will name just two examples. The first 
has received considerable attention from the media, and many of you may be 
familiar with it: the introduction, in 2006, of a language and civil integration test 
that migrants must pass in their country of origin before they can be admitted to 
reside in the Netherlands. Although framed in general terms, this requirement 
only applies to migrant partners and spouses, and only to those coming from 
non-western countries and not accompanying a highly skilled labour migrant.  
The second current restriction on family migration that I would like to 
mention has received less public attention, but is as, if not more, disruptive of 
family life as the “integration abroad” criterion. This particular restriction only 
applies to the family members of status-holding refugees, a category of residents 
for whom return to the country of origin is out of the question. Consequently,  
family reunification can only occur in the Netherlands. In accordance with EU 
law, refugees do not have to meet income requirements to qualify for family 
reunification. Nor do their family members have to take an integration test 
abroad or pay administrative fees.  And yet in recent years around 80% of the 
applications for family reunification put in by family members of status holding 
refugees have been refused by the Dutch  authorities.6 Even in cases in which 
there are no doubts concerning the validity of the marriage and where DNA tests 
have proven the genetic link between parents and children, Dutch authorities 
have refused admission because of conflicting testimonies on details of daily 
life.7
Up until 1985 Dutch nationality and migration law drew a line between 
families along gendered lines. The wives and children of a Dutch male family 
head belonged to his nation, the Netherlands; those of a foreign male family 
head belonged to his. Nowadays these fields of law have become gender neutral. 
They now regulate inclusion and exclusion along different lines, that not only 
distinguish between families, but also cut straight through them, separating 
spouse from spouse and parent from child. And yet, until the mid 1990’s, 
protection of the family as a unit still stood solidly at the base of Dutch 
migration policies. Why is this no longer the case?  
 Of course rules can be abused, and government authorities should take 
measures to prevent fraud. But is it reasonable to assume that 80% of the 
refugees who travelled to the Netherlands on their own, often because they had 
to opt for dangerous routes run by smugglers, and who claim to have left a 
spouse and/or children behind, are all in fact single and making false claims? 
 
How did we reach this point? 
 
That was the question that I set out to answer in my book: The Family and the 
Nation: Dutch family migration policies in the context of changing family 
                                                 
6 Letter from the Minister for Immigration and Asylum affairs, 13 December 2012,  nr. 5711168/11,  
in response to a request for information from Defense for Children. 
7 Rechtbank Den Haag, zp Amsterdam, 11 november 2011, nr. AWB 11/22096. 
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norms.8
The chief addressee of the first project was the male breadwinner and 
head of the family. He received the family wage and benefits under public 
housing, health insurance, and social insurance schemes guaranteed by the 
welfare state – all meant to ensure he could fulfil his financial obligations as a 
breadwinner.
 In the first chapter of that book, I discuss the changes that have 
occurred, in the Netherlands, since the Second World War, in dominant family 
norms, and what these changes have meant for the notion of the citizen as an 
active and responsible member of the national community. I trace how, in the 
period of reconstruction that immediately followed the Second World War, the 
Dutch established a modern welfare state that took the gendered nuclear family 
as its basic unit. There were two sides to this project. The first focussed on the 
family income; the second on a modern lifestyle.  
9 His wife was the main protagonist of the second and parallel  
project of modernity. Initially through religious institutions but increasingly 
through secular and professional social services, it was through wives and 
mothers  that Dutch society was groomed for the post-war industrialized 
consumer society.  Marga Klompé, the first Dutch minister of welfare, described 
the mission of social services as one of helping various groups or categories who 
risked being left behind – and here she specifically names migrants, repatriates, 
refugees and so-called maladapted families – to adapt to society as a whole. 
Housewives – referred to as “social pace setters” –  were encouraged, informed 
and, if need be, actively instructed in their role as home-makers, care providers 
and mothers of a new generation.10
Even though the work women performed in the home was not validated in 
economic terms, it was validated in normative terms. Although subordinate to 
and dependent of her male breadwinner husband, the wife and mother was, 
nonetheless, relevant for the notion of citizenship that he stood for. Without a 
family to support, a wife to groom him and a mother who could pass on the 
virtues of citizenship to his children, a man was no true and proper citizen. As 
long as the male breadwinner remained emblematic of substantive citizenship, 
preserving the unity of his family remained a key principle of Dutch nationality 
and migration law.
  
11
In the course of the 1970s, the women’s movement started to take hold in 
the Netherlands. The sexual revolution took off. Legal reforms and the 
introduction of welfare benefits made divorce a real option, and other limits to 
sexual freedom were challenged: heteronormativity; parental control over the 
sexual freedom of minors. Marriage as an institution was put to the test. Initially, 
  
                                                 
8 Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. 
9 J. Bussemaker, Betwiste zelfstandigheid. Individualisering, sekse en verzorgingsstaat, Amsterdam: 
SUA, 1993. R. Holtmaat, Met zorg een recht? Een analyse van het politiek-juridische vertoog over 
bijstandsrecht, Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1992. 
10 M. Gastelaars, Een geregeld leven. Sociologie en sociale politiek in Nederland 1925-1968, 
Amsterdam: SUA, 1985, p. 177- 182. 
11 B. de Hart supra note 1. 
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this moral ferment did not lead to significant changes in Dutch family law, for 
the simple reason that debates on sexuality had resulted in a political deadlock 
between Christian morality, feminist ethics of care and libertarian ideals of 
sexual freedom.12
Since the early 1990s, Dutch family law has been reformed on a number 
of fronts. Unmarried couples can secure their mutual rights and obligations as 
extensively as married ones can. Same sex partners enjoy nearly all the same 
rights as heterosexual ones. The relationship between parents and children has 
been rephrased in terms that allow for various forms of parenting in various 
combinations and various degrees of intensity. Young adolescents have become 
emancipated, to a degree at least, vis a vis their parents. Dutch family law no 
longer takes as its point of departure a religiously determined and state 
supported morality, but individual tastes and inclinations – no longer prescribed 
but a matter of personal choice.
 It took considerable debate and lengthy legal procedures that 
went as far as the European Court of Human Rights, before a new consensus 
finally emerged. Once that point had been reached, legislative changes followed 
each other in rapid succession. 
13
These changes in family law have occurred in tandem with shifts in social 
policy. The focus has shifted from the family wage to the individual earnings of 
adult citizens, whether male or female, whether married or single. Paid labour 
has become the sole measure of civic participation and worth; the unpaid role of 
wives and mothers in the moral production and reproduction of citizenship, both 
through family life and through voluntary community service, has become 
degraded to something for on the side. It is no longer validated as a parallel – if 
subordinate – facet of citizenship.
  
14
In practice, family life in the Netherlands has in fact remained generally 
more traditional than the laws that regulate it.
  
15
                                                 
12 Bussemaker supra note 9; See also G. Kooy, Seksualiteit, huwelijk en gezin in Nederland, Deventer: 
Van Loghum Slaterus, 1975. 
 None the less, the loss of 
appreciation for the family as a site of care and reproduction – both in the 
physical and normative sense – that current regulation expresses, helps explain, 
to my mind, how the Dutch government has been able to legitimate the far-
reaching interventions into cross-border family relations that increasingly 
characterise Dutch migration policy. Heterosexual marriage is no longer being 
enforced as the only legitimate form of family life, but neither is it being 
protected as an institution. Homosexuality and non-marital sex have lost their 
13 S. Wortmann, ‘Kroniek van het personen- en familierecht’, Nederlands Juristenblad 2000, nr.31, 
pp. 1584-1593. 
14 C.f. T. Knijn & P. Cuyvers, ‘Onduidelijke signalen, duidelijke effecten: gezinsbeleid in Nederland’, 
in: S. Grotenhuis et al. (eds) Hoeksteen of Zwerfkei. Het moderne gezin tussen individualisering en 
pedagogisering, Amsterdam: De Balie, 2002. 
15 M. Huisman, ‘Zoeken naar de waarde van het gezin. Een geschiedenis van de Nederlandse 
gezinsraad’, in: S. Grotenhuis et al. (eds), Hoeksteen of Zwerfkei. Het moderne gezin tussen 
individualisering en pedagogisering, Amsterdam: De Balie, 2002. 
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stigma, but matrimony has lost its sanctity. Man and wife are no longer brought 
together by God; the state can be justified in separating them in the national 
interest. While the relationship between parent and child still enjoys a strong 
degree of protection, particularly in the realm of international law, it too has 
become more vulnerable to state intervention. The parent-child relationship has 
become differentiated, based on various grounds, to be enjoyed in varying 
degrees of intensity and to be shared among varying coalitions of parenting 
adults. The complexities, choices and negotiations that this implies justify the 
notion that not everyone is equipped with the necessary skills and maturity to 
cope. Like citizenship, family life has become a matter of individual 
responsibility, but one that allows for and even requires monitoring by a tutorial 
state. Ironically, a development that started with a struggle for sexual freedom, 
has resulted in the creation of new vectors for state intervention in the intimate 
sphere, one of these being migration law.  
 
Is there cause for concern? 
 
Mary Ann Glendon has given a detailed account of the developments that have 
taken place both in family law and in social policies in the United States and in a 
number of Western European countries since the Second World War. Reviewing 
these changes, Glendon remarks that ‘not one of [the]… formerly basic 
assumptions has survived unchanged. Most have been eliminated, and some 
have been turned on their heads… The past twenty years have witnessed the 
movement from undercurrent to mainstream in family law of individualistic, 
egalitarian, and secularizing trends that have been gaining power in Western 
legal systems since the late eighteenth century’.16
Regarding the first issue, Glendon warns against the material costs of 
devaluating the family as a social group. Families, as providers of income, care 
and services have always been and will most likely remain an indispensable 
mechanism through which people deal with the dependency of the young, the 
disabled and the frail elderly. But as Joan Tronto has pointed out, the shift in 
focus from family to individual has not resulted in states completely taking over 
these functions from the family as an element of public responsibility. On the 
contrary. If anything, issues of care and interdependency have become less 
rather than more prominent on political agendas. Only minimal public facilities, 
 Not only in the Netherlands, 
but elsewhere too, family laws that were originally organized around a unitary 
conception of the family as a heteronormative marriage-centred and patriarchal, 
have increasingly come to focus on the autonomous individual: sexually 
emancipated, gender neutral and self-supporting. In Glendon’s eyes, this raises 
two issues for concern, the first relates to our well-being on the personal level; 
the second to that of our political communities. 
                                                 
16 M.A. Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, law and family in the United States and 
Western Europe, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989, p. 292. 
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at best, have replaced the tasks of care, home maintenance and cultural transfer 
that former housewives used to perform before they entered the paid labour 
market – tasks they carried out not only in their own homes, but also beyond, as 
neighbours, members of an extended family or congregation, or simply as 
involved citizens.17 In the current financial crisis, the minimal range of public 
substitutes that has been introduced to compensate for the loss in unpaid 
services, is moreover subject to cuts.  Glendon worries that states have too little 
eye for the vital role that families still play in national societies; that states will 
fail to provide families with the material support that they need, and that they 
will neglect or even destroy social networks, special arrangements and other 
environmental factors that families need in order to thrive.18
Increasingly, relatively wealthy nations like the Netherlands have come to 
rely on poorly paid migrants to fill the emerging gaps in home-based care and 
home maintenance. Since the value of this work is not publicly acknowledged, 
neither is there any acknowledgement of those who now perform it. In the 
Netherlands, as elsewhere, migrants providing home-based care and household 
services are frequently denied legal status. This is another example of how 
Dutch migration law presently draws the power of the state into the intimate 
sphere.
 
19
Regarding her second, more political, reason for concern, Glendon points out 
that families, as more or less distinct social units, form normative fields that 
differ from and can stand in apposition to dominant normative discourse 
transmitted through state institutions.
 
20 In a similar vein, Janet Finch has 
theorised the distinction between the private morality of extended families, and 
the public morality expressed through the legal context in which these operate.21 
As semi-autonomous normative fields, to borrow Sally Falk Moore’s 
terminology,22
In a more philosophical vein, Isaiah Berlin has made a similar point in his 
well-known essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in which he defends the need for 
normative pluralism.
 families help to maintain normative pluralism and to educate a 
critical citizenry.  
23
                                                 
17 J.C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: a political argument for an ethic of care, New York: Routledge, 
1993. 
 In his words, “The world that we encounter in ordinary 
experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally 
ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of some of which must 
18 Glendon supra note 16, p. 306-311. 
19 S. Van Walsum, ‘Regulating Migrant Domestic Work in the Netherlands. Opportunities and 
pitfalls’, Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, vol.23 nr. 1 (2011), pp.141-165. 
20 Glendon supra note 16, p. 298-306. 
21 J. Finch, Family Obligations and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989. 
22 S. Falk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate 
subject of study’, Law & society Review, vol. 7 no. 4 (1973),  pp. 719-746. 
23 I. Berlin, Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995,  pp.167-217. 
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inevitably involve the sacrifice of others.”24 As a result, people must make 
choices, and there is no single recipe for reaching the “right choice”.  People 
choose as they do “because their life and thought are determined by fundamental 
moral categories and concepts that are… a part of their being and thought and 
sense of their own identity; part of what makes them human. ”25 As Berlin 
points out earlier in his essay, a person’s sense of moral and social identity is 
intelligible only in terms of the social networks in which he or she takes part.26
In this light, it is striking to note that, in the same period that the new 
individualist consensus was reached in Dutch family law, the Dutch honeymoon 
with normative pluralism in the form of multiculturalism came to an end. 
Before, in the 1970’s and 1980’s – the  same period in which Dutch family 
norms were being hotly contested – migrants’ cultural and religious rights were 
barely being questioned. Nor were the cross-border family ties associated with 
those rights. In a context of accelerated decolonization and anti-racist activism, 
the dominant aspiration was to develop a  multicultural society, in which no 
cultural tradition was promoted as superior to any other.
 
The more these networks differ, the less consensus there will be on moral 
categories and concepts, but also the more scope for normative choices. 
27
Once a new consensus was reached in the field of family law, it became 
possible to apply family norms as a moral standard. To my mind it is no 
coincidence that it was in this period that a new interest emerged in defining a 
single standard of civic virtue as expression of Dutch national identity and 
guarantee for national cohesion. Having and maintaining a distinct culture as an 
ethnic minority was no longer seen as a right, but as a hindrance to integration.
 Migrant families were 
not expected to adhere to the same moral order as Dutch ones, and given the 
highly contested nature of Dutch family norms at the time, it is hard to see how 
they could have been.   
28 
This implied a policy of assimilation, and such a policy needed a dominant 
normative framework for migrants to assimilate into. This normative framework 
came to be expressed in the same terms that informed the new consensus in 
family law: equality between the sexes, sexual freedom, the individual right to 
choose and the individual responsibility that all this implied. As in the 
contemporaneous discourse on social security, in the emerging discourse on 
integration too, civic participation came to be primarily defined in terms of paid 
labour.29 Issues of faith and culture were relegated to the private sphere.30
                                                 
24 Ibid. p. 213-214. 
 Like 
25 Ibid. p. 217. 
26 Ibid p. 199. 
27 W. Tinnemans, Een gouden armband: Een geschiedenis van mediterrane immigranten in Nederland 
(1945-1994), Utrecht: Nederlands Centrum Buitenlanders, 1994. 
28 Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23684, nr. 2. 
29 Verwey-Jonker Instituut, Bronnenstudie Integratiebeleid. Deelrapport 1: Het integratiebeleid 1970 
tot 2002 op hoofdlijnen, Utrecht: Verwey-Jonker Instituut, 2003. 
30 L. Mulder, ‘Hollandse nieuwe’, Migrantenrecht  1994, nr.8, pp. 157-162. 
 9 
acts of home-based care and household maintenance, these became disqualified 
as facets of civic participation. 
 
New lines of inclusion and exclusion 
I argue that the new, gender neutral, secular and individualist moral order that 
informs both current Dutch family law and the new Dutch perspective on civic 
virtue, has made it possible to set new parameters for inclusion and exclusion, 
replacing the old patriarchal ones that have become discredited. The old 
discredited norms are now projected onto that segment of the Dutch population 
that forms the chief target of restrictive family migration policies: those Dutch 
citizens and residents labelled as “non-western” and generally assumed to be of 
the Islamic faith. It is their association with a rejected normative order that 
justifies state interference in their family lives and the exclusion of their foreign 
family members. 
  In October of 2009, our former cabinet published a document introducing 
proposals to further restrict marriage migration through measures that are 
repressive in nature.31
 In the introduction to the proposals, cross-border families, i.e. families 
made up of a Dutch citizen or resident and his or her foreign spouse or partner, 
are depicted as being patriarchal, sexist, religiously bound and gendered. The 
explicit assumption is that these families are formed by men of non-western 
origin bringing over non-western wives. He is lacking in the individualist spirit 
and self-sufficiency required by our modern, competitive and market-driven 
society; she is passive, poorly educated and submissive, incapable of raising 
children to join the new breed of citizens. He forms a threat to her emancipation, 
so she should be excluded in her own interests. She forms a threat to the Dutch 
nation’s future, so her exclusion can be justified in the national interest.  
 Besides further limiting admissions, these measures aim 
to tighten control and widen the scope for criminal sanctions. Some of the 
proposed measures have already been implemented; others will probably be 
implemented shortly. 
That Dutch and legally resident migrant women, too, might bring over 
family members from abroad to join them in the Netherlands, does not even 
figure in the imaginary of these proposals. Nor do same sex couples. While 
mention is made of men of ethnically Dutch origin marrying foreign brides, 
these men are assumed to do so because they expect a foreign wife to be less 
emancipated, more compliant, subservient and ‘willing to provide sexual 
services’ than a woman raised in the Netherlands. These men are in fact 
discredited as Dutch citizens, accused of displaying an attitude that “does not 
coincide with the Dutch premise of equality within marriage.”32
 Because the new consensus on family norms is reflected in the new model 
of civic virtue, policy documents can discredit members of cross-border families 
  
                                                 
31 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 175, nr. 1. 
32 Ibid. p. 6. 
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as citizens, by defining their family norms as divergent. But current Dutch 
discourse on cross-border families goes a step further. Not only discrediting the 
members of cross-border families as potential citizens, it also sheds doubt on the 
sincerity of their cross-border family ties. The 2009 policy document goes so far 
as to suggest that foreign brides are being brought to the Netherlands not for 
romantic motives, not even for sex,  but to be put to work as unpaid domestic 
workers in their in-laws’ homes.33 In other words, the implicit claim is that these 
women are being trafficked as domestic workers under the guise of family 
reunification. The almost total refusal of applications for family reunification 
with status holding refugees, that I referred to earlier in my talk, is explicitly 
being celebrated as proof of  the success of measures to prevent – among other 
things – trafficking in children.34
 It is important to note that Dutch migration law does not disqualify all 
cross-border family ties to the same degree. On the grounds of EU law, 
economically active and/or solvent EU citizens may not be hindered in their 
freedom of movement within the EU, and their right to family reunification is 
therefore well protected. The family life of highly skilled migrants workers from 
outside of the EU is facilitated as well. Family migrants coming from so-called 
western nations like Canada, the US or Japan, are subject to less restrictions than 
those coming from so-called “non-western countries”. They don’t have to leave 
the Netherlands and put in an application abroad before being allowed to stay 
here with their family members. Nor do they have to first pass an integration test 
in their country of origin. And their affective ties, and those of skilled labour 
migrants, to children left behind, are not subjected to the same intensive scrutiny 
as those of refugees.  
  
 
What to do? 
 
So where does this bring us? Is it so unreasonable of the Dutch state to want to 
control migration, and not leave this entirely to the personal choices that citizens 
and legally resident foreigners make in the intimate sphere – leaving aside the 
very complex issue of marriages of convenience? And shouldn’t we value the 
gains that have been made in the emancipation of women, minors and sexual 
minorities?  What is wrong with letting the new ideals of individual autonomy 
and economic independence play a role in processes of inclusion and exclusion? 
And given that trafficking does occur, involving shocking forms of exploitation, 
shouldn’t states take action to prevent the abuse of family migration policies for 
such criminal purposes?35
                                                 
33 Ibid. p. 6. 
 I shall return to these very legitimate questions 
34 Letter from Minister Leers of Immigration, Integration and Asylum Affairs of  15 February 2012, 
nr. 2012Z00940 
35 See also: E. Kleemans, Georganiseerde misdaad en de zichtbare hand, Den Haag: Boom Lemma, 
2011. 
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towards the end of my talk. But first I want to make a short detour via the ideas 
that the artist, psychoanalyst and feminist theorist Bracha Ettinger has developed 
in her work on what she refers to as the “matrixial borderspace”,36
In her work, Ettinger rejects the notion, dominant in current Western 
thought, that subjective consciousness can only exist and develop in radical 
opposition to an abstract and objectified other. As alternative she theorises 
subjectivity-as-encounter, the product of shared and intersubjective processes 
between concrete persons, producing mutual change and becoming; of, in her 
words, “difference based on webbing of links and not on essence”.
 to see how 
these might help us reconceptualise migration law.  
37
Ettinger proposes that this way of thinking leads to an alternative 
approach to the figure of the stranger. Where according to the dominant 
perception we tend to make a radical distinction between the self as subject and 
the stranger as other, drawing a line as it were between the two, in her view what 
runs between the self and the stranger,  is not a fixed line defining inclusion and 
exclusion, but a history of greater and lesser degrees of mediated interaction. In 
her perception the border is not a line that separates, but a shared field that joins; 
it is an overlapping experience that forms an integral part of the subjective 
experience of both the self and the stranger. This is not to say that the self and 
the stranger are not distinct – they are, but in relation to each other. In Ettinger’s 
vision, foreignness represents and is engaged in a continual negotiation without 
exhausting recognition, without claiming full understanding, without even 
expecting love and harmony, and without definite resolution.
  
38
To clarify what Ettinger’s work could mean for our thinking on migration 
law, I would like to make use of two images, representing two different ways of 
thinking about the world. The first, which informs our current systems of 
migration law, is the familiar Wesftphalian perception of the world as being 
made up of distinct and separate sovereign nations. Each has its own shape, 
character and history – its own national identity – and  the borders that mark  its 
territory also serve to delineate its population. Anyone leaving one national unit 
to move to another must first be given official permission to enter and, having 
gained entry to a new territory, is expected to also merge with the new national 
unit. From this perspective the world is in fact viewed as a huge crazy quilt, 
made up of separate patches, all of the same nature but each with its own shape, 
colouring and specific history. Each marked vis à vis the others by its own 
embroidered border. 
  
                                                 
36 B.L. Ettinger, The Matrixial Borderspace, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006. 
37 Ibid. p. 109. 
38 Ibid. p. 110. 
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But how adequate is this perception of the world? If we consider our daily lives, 
what we eat, what we wear, the music we listen to, the programmes we watch on 
television, the sites we visit via internet – are these all national products of our 
 13 
own native soil? And what about the people we meet on the market, in the 
stores, at our work, on the street, in our doctor’s waiting room, on our children’s 
school playground, in our own homes, on Facebook. Have we all lived our 
whole lives within one and the same national patch? Are we all part of one 
shared national history? Even if we go through our most intimate contacts – our 
mate, in-laws, friends from way back, aunts, uncles, cousins – are they all tied to 
the same patch of territory and history that we are? And we ourselves – how 
many borders have we crossed for work, study, travel – or love? 
However attached we may feel to our own national patch, we are also all 
linked directly or indirectly to a vast number of people located on other spots on 
this earth, through a densely woven web of connections, movements and 
interactions. If we try to visualise the world in these terms, we arrive at a very 
different image than the Westphalian crazy quilt of nations . 
 
This second map shows all the open flight routes of the world. The web that 
these form together  is so dense in places that whole expanses of territory are 
lost from view, let alone the borders that subdivide them  into nations. And it 
14 
 
only charts flight routes. What if we were to super-impose similar maps charting 
trade routes and all the lines of communication linking people all over the 
world: e-mail, mobile phones, Skype, social media? 
 If we visualise the world in this way, as one densely knotted web of 
border-crossing interactions, it is easier to think of the foreigner as Ettinger 
does, as someone who is  neither cut out from the system nor assimilated to it, 
and who therefore cannot be articulated as a parasite and cannot be rejected.  
 
Can law express an alternative perspective? 
Glendon, writing in the late 1980’s, was pessimistic about the possibilities of 
western liberal legal theory being able to produce the concepts or the vocabulary 
to deal with social groups like families – let alone cross-border ones. She 
observed that mainstream jurists are primarily preoccupied with “individual 
rights, with attacking or aggrandizing the state, or with tending the machinery of 
bureaucracy.”39
On the level of metajuridical discourse, Glendon’s observation seems to hold 
true for migration law. Theorists who analyse the normative dilemma’s inherent 
to the regulation of migration consistently focus on the binary tension between 
the human rights of individual migrants – typically asylum seekers or labour 
migrants – and the sovereign right of states to protect the interests of a national 
citizenry. The shared interests of citizens and foreigners who together form 
cross-border social groups, like families, are at best mentioned as an 
afterthought; at worst entirely left out of the equation.  
  
A frequently use metaphor is that of the stranger knocking at the door. Would 
you let a stranger into your home? is the rhetorical question.40 In posing such 
questions, political theorists do not entertain the possibility that the “stranger” at 
the door might not be a stranger at all, but the parent of  someone on the inside, 
or the spouse, or the child. Yet this is in fact often the case. In 2011, half of the 
applications for admission to the Netherlands were for purposes of family 
migration.41 Moreover, empirical studies indicate that people migrating for other 
purposes than family reunification – labour migrants or asylum seekers for 
example – also tend to move to countries where they have relatives living, or 
close acquaintances.42
                                                 
39 Glendon supra note 16, p. 309. 
 
40C.f. A. Altman & C.H. Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009; M. Waltzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New 
York: Basic Books, 1983; J.H.M.M. Tholen, Vreemdelingenbeleid en rechtvaardigheid? Een 
wijsgerige studie naar onze beoordelingen van immigratie- en naturalisatiebeleid. Nijmegen: Catholic 
University of Nijmegen, 1997. 
41 Annual statistics of the Dutch immigration and naturalization service IND over 2011. 
42 V.F. Bashi, Survival of the Knitted: Immigrant Social Networks in a Stratified World, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007; H. Crawley, S. Castles & S. Lougha, States of Conflict: causes and 
patterns of forced migration to the EU and policy responses, London: Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 2003. 
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Even scholars who are more critical of exclusionary policies, generally take 
the nation as a given when analysing the normative dilemmas posed by 
migration law. Linda Bosniak for example is well aware of the fact that many 
irregular migrants residing within a national territory are linked in various ways 
with that nation’s body of citizens, and to a degree should even be identified 
with it. She argues that the concept of citizenship is multifaceted, including 
substantive elements such as civic participation, as well as the more formal ones 
like the possession of a passport. To the extent that irregular migrants develop 
the substantive qualities of citizenship, through participation as workers and 
consumers and through engagement with  civil society, justifying their exclusion 
becomes more problematic, is her claim.43
However even Bosniak does not take into consideration that many persons 
may be tightly knitted into a nation through intense bonds of intimacy, without 
even having entered that nation’s territory. While she concedes that the formal 
legal notion of nationality does not necessarily contain everyone who could or 
should be included as part of the national population, she fails to challenge the 
notion that the physical parameters of a nation’s territory form an equally 
inadequate tool for distinguishing insiders from outsiders. Bosniak’s proposed 
solution, to make nations “hard on the outside”, and “soft on the inside”, does 
not offer a normative framework for dealing with the fact that social relations 
are not contained by, but transgress national borders – not only the legal borders 
distinguishing regular from irregular residents, but also the physical ones that 
define the nation’s “outside” vis à vis its “inside”. Karen Knop’s notion of 
relational nationality comes closer to what I have in mind.
  
44
If we leave the realm of metajuridical discourse, and move to that of legal 
practice and jurisprudence, the discourse becomes more complex and more 
promising. On that level I believe an alternative perspective is being developed, 
in which legal significance is being attached to processes of cross-border  
interdependency and intersubjectivity. This development has its roots in family 
and child protection law, a field in which lawyers have worked hard to attribute 
a new meaning to the right to respect for family life as protected by article 8 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights, a meaning that differs from the 
original one grounded in the patriarch’s right to non-intervention in his private 
affairs. These lawyers have worked to give expression to the normative 
implications of a pedagogical finding: that the parent-child relationship, as an 
 However, by 
limiting her analysis to nationality law, Knop avoids addressing the challenges 
her approach raises in terms of migration control, i.e. for the sovereign right of 
the state to include and exclude non-nationals from its territory. 
                                                 
43 L. Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien. Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006. 
44 K. Knop, ‘Relational nationality’, in: T. Aleinikoff & D. Klusmeyer (eds), Citizenship Today: 
Global perspectives and Practices, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International peace 2001, 
pp. 89-126. 
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interactive and intersubjective process, impacts upon the development of a 
child’s subjectivity.  An important insight that has come to inform this 
jurisprudence, is that family life is not only about financial support, the exercise 
of parental authority, and the provision of care, but that it is also about the 
development of personal identity.45
From family and child protection law, this insight has spilled over to 
migration law, as lawyers have given legal meaning to the implications of 
restrictive migration policies for the family life of geographically separated 
family members.
  
46
I shall quote a few examples from the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) to elucidate these developments, and show how I 
believe they contribute towards a concept of the right to respect for family life 
that is both intersubjective and transnational and, as such, challenges the 
dominant perspective on migration control that takes as its point of departure the 
human rights of the individual migrant versus the national interest  defended by 
the  sovereign state. 
 In the process, this case law, besides highlighting the 
significance of family life for the rights of the child, is also starting to theorise 
how the affective bonds and the related commitment to, and responsibility for, 
the provision of material support and care that family life implies, relate to the 
human dignity of mature adults. If we bear in mind that article 2 of the first 
protocol by the European Convention of Human Rights obliges member states, 
in all matters related to education, to respect the right of parents to ensure the 
education of their children is in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions, it becomes clear that – as Glendon observed – respect 
for family life and an openness to normative pluralism are closely related – a 
point also brought home to me by one of my PhD students.  
 
Cross-border family life in the case law of the ECtHR 
In December 2001, the ECtHR passed judgement in the case of the family Sen 
versus the Netherlands. 47
                                                 
45 ECtHR 13 July 2006, nr 58757/00, Jäggi v. Zwitserland; EHRM 20 December 2007, nr. 23890/02, 
Phinikaridou t. Cyprus. 
 This case concerned the Turkish girl Sinem Sen who, 
at the age of nine, applied for admission to the Netherlands to join her parents 
there. The Netherlands had refused admission on the grounds that the child had 
already spent six years in Turkey, separate from her parents. In the eyes of the 
Dutch authorities, the relationship between Sinem and her parents was no longer 
such that it could justify admission on the grounds of family reunification. The 
unanimous judgement of the ECtHR that the Dutch state had violated the right 
to respect for family life of Sinem and her parents, came as a surprise in the 
Netherlands, since all previous procedures in similar cases had ended in favour 
46 Pathbreaking case in this respect was that of Berrehab v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 21 June 1988, nr. 
10730/84. 
47 ECtHR 21 December 2001, nr. 31465/96 Sen v. The Netherlands. 
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of the Dutch state. As I have argued elsewhere, the judgement in the Sen case is 
in fact ambiguous and subject to various interpretations.48
The reason I refer to the Sen case now, is the explicit reference that the 
ECtHR makes in this immigration law case to previous judgments in family and 
child protection law. In reference to that case law, the ECtHR makes the point 
that a young child has a pressing need to be integrated into her parents’ family, 
and that states have the obligation to facilitate this as long as the parents are 
willing and able to care for the child. The ECtHR moreover acknowledges that 
family life is a dynamic process, and that the decision of parents to leave their 
child in the care of others at one point in time should not jeopardise their right to 
bring the child back into their own home at a later date. Where in its earlier 
judgments on migration law the ECtHR had prioritised states’ right to regulate 
migration, in this case the child’s interest in sharing family life with her parents 
trumped state sovereignty.  
  
 The next case I wish to refer to, concerns an Afghan woman who was 
admitted to the Netherlands as a refugee, and her three children who ended up in 
a refugee camp in Pakistan and subsequently applied for admission to join their 
mother in the Netherlands. The Dutch government contested the admissibility of 
the children’s complaints, arguing that – since they resided in Pakistan – these 
children fell beyond the Dutch state’s jurisdiction. The ECtHR ruled however 
that, as regards family life, no distinction can be drawn between those applicants 
living within the borders of a member state and those residing elsewhere.49
 This awareness that family life is intersubjective is particularly explicit in 
the case law of the ECtHR on protection against inhuman or degrading 
treatment. In such cases, the ECtHR has ruled that, when one family member is 
threatened with execution or made subject to any other form of inhuman 
treatment, his or her family members are violated in their human dignity as well. 
 In 
other words, what is at stake is not separate individuals’ distinct subjective 
claims to respect for family life, but the intersubjective claim to respect for 
family life which is shared by all the family members involved, not only those 
residing within the member state’s realm of jurisdiction, but also those who may 
be residing abroad.  
                                                 
48S. van Walsum, ‘Comment on the Sen Case. How wide is the Margin of Appreciation Regarding the 
Admission of Children for Purposes of Family Reunification?’, in: European Journal of Migration and 
Law, vol. 4, nr. 4, pp. 511-520.. 
49 ECtHR  20 October 2005, nr. 8876/04, Haydarie v. The Netherlands. 
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Because of their shared intimacy, each family member shares in the inhuman 
treatment inflicted upon the others.50
 In 2006, the ECtHR ruled in the case of a Congolese refugee residing in 
Canada, and her five year old daughter Tabitha. Together with an uncle who was 
trying to bring her to her mother in Canada, Tabitha had been arrested at the 
Brussels airport for travelling under false papers. After having sent the uncle 
back to the Netherlands, where he had been admitted as a refugee, the Belgian 
authorities placed Tabitha in alien detention and subsequently deported her back 
to Kinshasa, without taking proper measures to ensure she would be looked after 
on arrival. Neither did the Belgian authorities inform the child’s mother of the 
impending deportation, let alone consult her on it. The ECtHR ruled that 
Tabitha’s detention and subsequent deportation not only amounted to inhuman 
treatment of the child herself, but of the mother as well. By neglecting to consult 
the mother, the Belgian authorities had failed to take into account her sentiments 
and the responsibility that she bore for the welfare of her child. They had 
ignored an essential aspect of her identity as a mature adult; of her humanity. 
Their treatment of her was inhuman. In reaching this conclusion, the ECtHR 
explicitly took the proximity of the family tie into consideration, attaching a 
certain weight to the parent-child bond.
 
51
I see in this case-law the start of a vocabulary and concepts that can give 
legal significance to the intersubjective experience of family life in a cross-
border context. Although the Tabitha case remains exceptional, the ECtHR has 
ruled in at least two other cases that whenever a member state decides on the 
expulsion or (re)admission of an alien, it must weigh the implications of that 
decision for the family life of those involved against the national interest.
  
52 
Although member states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in immigration 
affairs, they must assess the impact of their decisions on the family life of those 
involved – including those living abroad.  A complete lack of such an 
assessment will always mean a violation of the right to respect for family life.53
 
  
There is no final solution 
I now wish to return to the questions I raised earlier. What about the need to 
protect gains made with respect to women’s emancipation, children’s rights and 
sexual freedoms? What about the security, distributive justice and democratic 
rule that a nationalist paradigm, and notions of state sovereignty and national 
self-determination, support? We need to acknowledge that both of the images 
that I have projected here are just that: images. They are ways in which we can 
                                                 
50 ECtHR 8 November 2005, nr. 13284/04, Bader v. Sweden, published with comment by Battjes in 
RV 2005/4; ECtHR 22 June 2006, nr. 13178/03, D. v. Turkey. 
51 ECtHR 12 October 2006, nr. 13178/03, Mayeka & Mitunga v. Belgium. 
52 ECtHR 12 February 2009, nr. 2512/04,  Nolan v. Russia; ECtHR 28 June 2011, nr. 55597/09, Nunez 
v. Norway, to be published with comment by Ismaïli in RV 2011/20. 
53 ECtHR 27 September 2011, nr. 39417/07, Alim v. Russia. 
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perceive the world; we must be careful not to equate them with the reality that 
they reflect. Nor should we assume one image is more “true” than the other. 
Ettinger in fact does not claim the form of consciousness that she theorises is 
any more real or valid than the dominant notion that subjective consciousness 
depends on radical separation between the subject and objectified others.54
The fact that perspectives can supplement each other does not mean they 
can be easily reconciled with each other. In fact, Ettinger theorises that it is 
virtually impossible to engage in an intersubjective mode of consciousness while 
at the same time being conscious of the self as a separate subject, and vice 
versa.
 She 
does postulate that our understanding of what it means to be human will be more 
complete if we accept that, next to a subjective consciousness of the self as 
separate from the other, there is also a shared and intersubjective consciousness 
of the self as not separate from, but the product of interaction with, others.  
55
Glendon concedes that, while meaningful freedom cannot be achieved in a 
society of isolated individuals, social groups like families have their dark side 
that is difficult to reconcile with individual autonomy – a fact the ECtHR too has 
readily acknowledged.
 Similarly, while picturing the world as a vast web of cross-border 
interactions helps us visualise the experience of transnational connections, it 
distracts our attention for the fact that many people derive important forms of 
security from picturing the world as a crazy quilt of self-defined and self-
contained nations. The idea that all citizens of a given nation are equal before 
the law; that a national government should guarantee its citizens certain minimal 
social rights; that as a citizen one is entitled to participation in the democratic 
mode of national government.  
56 As Glendon points out, families and tight-knit 
communities can be hotbeds of inequality and constraints. Moreover, she 
observes, we must assume that any legislative efforts made by states on behalf 
of social groups like families would be carried on with close attention to such 
matters as how the group’s internal functioning comports with widely shared 
values, or the values to which the political regime is committed.57 However 
essential they may be for human reproduction in physical, social and moral 
terms, social groups like families can also form a threat to individual autonomy, 
and a challenge to legitimate state sovereignty grounded in national democratic 
institutions. To once more quote Isaiah Berlin, we do well to acknowledge that 
human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry 
with one another.58
                                                 
54 Ettinger supra note 36, p. 109. 
 So the point is not to replace dominant legal discourse in 
migration law with another, expressing Essinger’s perspective, but to develop an 
55 Ibid. p. 110. 
56 ECtHR 14 June 2011, nr. 38058/09, Osman v. Denmark, to be published with comment by Arbaoui 
in RV 2011/19..  
57 Glendon supra note 16, p. 310. 
58 Berlin supra note 23, p. 216. 
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alternative legal discourse inspired by her perspective, that can challenge the 
dominant one and engage with it in constructive dialogue. 
 
Legal science as crucible of competing perspectives 
The fact that family ties must always be taken into consideration in migration 
law does not mean these ties will always trump a state’s sovereign right to 
control migration – far from it, any more than that the fundamental rights of an 
individual family member must necessarily give way to another family 
member’s claim to family life. The emerging legal vocabulary that gives 
expression to the intersubjective field of family life does not disqualify the 
concept of state sovereignty or that of individual autonomy. What it does do, is 
start to enable us to negotiate the tensions between the two perspectives 
theorised by Ettinger, between that of the subject separated from, and that of the 
subject linked to, the other; between  a crazy quilt of nations and a world-wide 
web; between John as the American alien, and John as the son, husband and 
father of Dutch citizens. 
But anyone who has ever taken part in any form of negotiation, knows 
this involves more than mastering the vocabulary and concepts needed to 
express one’s own point of view and being able to understand and respond to 
that of one’s opponent. The outcome of negotiations also depends on issues of 
power, possible alliances, strategic insight and contingency. How changes in 
vocabulary and concepts affect the negotiating process, and to whose advantage,  
is not predetermined but dependent of many factors. To understand law as a 
social process, we must go further than to study legislative texts and case law. 
While the case law of the ECtHR offers a starting point for developing a 
vocabulary and concepts that can validate cross-border family ties, it also gives 
expression to competing interests and alternative perspectives that can eclipse 
this potentially transnational perspective. An emerging discourse on private life 
grounded in a given locality, for example, may reaffirm the notion that modes of 
belonging are necessarily linked to national territory.59 Meanwhile, next to the 
ECtHR in Strasburg, the European Court of Justice in Luxemburg is starting to 
play an increasingly prominent role in migration law. Although article 8 of the 
European Convention is relevant for its line of jurisprudence, it is none the less 
developing this in a very different direction from that of the Strasburg court, 
focussing less on family ties as an aspect of human dignity, and more on their 
role in facilitating the freedom of movement within the EU, and the production 
and reproduction of EU citizenship.60
I started this talk with a short historical sketch of how Dutch family 
norms, integration policies and migration law together changed within the 
   
                                                 
59 C.f. B. Aarrass, ‘Artikel 8 EVRM als middel tegen uitzetting’, in: Asiel &Migratierecht 2010/4, p. 
176-184, 2010. 
60 See for example EU Court of Justice 15 November 2011, C-256/11, Dereci, and comment of 
Groenendijk published in JV  2012/6.  
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shifting contexts of post-war reconstruction, decolonisation and globalisation. 
Without these insights, it is difficult to understand why John was originally 
defined as an alien but has now been allowed to transform himself into a born 
and bred Dutchman. To better understand how the tensions between competing 
perspectives on cross-border family relations are now being negotiated, and to 
anticipate how these negotiations might or might not be affected in the future by 
an enrichment of the vocabulary and concepts in play, we need insight into the 
shifting context in which those negotiations take place.  
As an academic discipline, law is ambivalent in that it implies both an 
internal and an external perspective.61
Like the two modes of consciousness theorized by Ettinger, like the 
alternating perspectives of a crazy quilt of nations and a  world wide web of 
relations – the internal and external perspectives on the law are equally valid, yet 
irreconcilable.  Again, the solution is not to abandon one in favour of the other, 
but to foster and maintain the friction between them. In my view, the 
inconsistencies, tensions and contradictions inherent to legal science are not 
weaknesses that disqualify it as an academic discipline. On the contrary: they 
shape the crucibles in which normative hypotheses can be put to the test. To 
quote a judge cited in Ashley Terlouw’s PhD study on the tension between 
judges’ moral autonomy and the principle of legal certainty and coherence: a 
judge who has never had a judgment overruled in appeal, is simply not a good 
judge .
 The internal perspective requires an 
encyclopaedic knowledge of rules and judgements, on different levels of 
jurisdiction, concerning a specific legal question. It calls for an overview and 
critical appraisal of all the argued positions at stake, as well as insight into their 
logical coherence and inconsistencies, and the ability to synthesise the whole 
and provide a convincingly motivated assessment. The external perspective 
requires insight into the cultural, social, political, economic and psychological 
dynamics that, together with law’s own vocabulary and concepts, drive the 
production of legal norms. While different authors have acknowledged the need 
to study law from both an internal and an external perspective, few if any have 
succeeded in doing justice to both at once. To do so is in fact difficult, since an 
internal perspective, that assumes the coherence of law’s logic, seems to 
preclude external explanations for the shifts in that logic, and vice versa.  
62
 
 
Plans for the future 
 
Well over a year ago, on Saint Valentine’s Day – a coincidence? – I received the 
news that I had been granted a VICI grant to run a five year research project: 
                                                 
61 H. Willekens, Vrouwelijkheid, mannelijkheid en recht. Theoretische verkenningen, Antwerpen: 
Kluwer, 1991. 
62 A. Terlouw, Uitspraak en afspraak. Samenwerking tussen vreemdelingenrechters bij ontbreken van 
hoger beroep, Den Haag: Boom , 2003, p. 177. 
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Migration Law as a Family Matter. This grant has made it possible for me to 
hire three PhD students and a post-doctoral researcher, and to continue working 
on research of my own. This forms a unique opportunity to work out ideas I 
have presented to you today:  
- to mine the case law in family and child protection law for more 
vocabulary and concepts that can be used in migration law to give 
substance to the notion of cross-border family ties; 
- to consistently look for and contrast perceptions of the family as an 
intersubjective normative field that links people across national 
borders, and perceptions of family norms as a marker of national 
difference; 
- to place the Dutch case in the broader context of the European Union 
and the affiliated projects of freedom of movement and EU citizenship; 
- to connect scholarship on migrant domestic workers with that on cross-
border family relations and migration law; 
- to continue relating the dynamics of migration law to the ongoing 
struggles, in other fields of law and policy, between individual, family 
and state.  
 
Since September of last year, four talented and enthusiastic researchers have 
joined me here at the Migration Law section of the VU Legal Faculty: two 
lawyers and two social scientists. Nadia Ismaïli is contrasting the human rights 
position of Dutch citizens with Dutch parents or children with that of Dutch 
citizens with foreign parents or children: do they have equal claims to social-
economic rights, to the right to respect for family life and to protection against 
inhuman treatment? Younous Arbaoui is exploring how tensions between 
individual, family and state are being negotiated, by studying this process 
through the magnifying glass of asylum law – in which family violence figures 
as a form of persecution on the one hand, and family relations as a major source 
of security in failed states on the other.  Johanne Søndergaard is doing 
comparative research on the relative significance of the breadwinner norm in 
national family values, social policies and migration law throughout the EU, 
questioning how possible differences might impact upon the project of the 
harmonisation of family migration law; Jill Alpes will do ethnographic research 
on domestic workers and the global care chain and critically assess current 
debates on migration and development in the light of her findings. I myself shall 
revisit the history of Dutch family migration policy since the second world war, 
and explore how shifts in the distribution of reproductive labour between family, 
market and welfare state have related to changes in the admission and continued 
residence rights of migrant spouses, extended family members and domestic 
workers.  
 Each of these five projects focuses in one way or the other on tensions 
between individual, family and state, and on the role of migration law in 
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mediating these tensions, but they also differ in various ways. First: the 
differences in methodology: legal, sociological, ethnographic and historical. 
Second: shifts in the jurisdictional level of analysis: national, EU or 
international. Finally, variations in perspective. Where Nadia’s project will 
focus on the need to protect family life, that of Younous will draw attention to 
the shadow-side of family life and to the dilemmas that states must face in trying 
to do justice, through international law, to both family life and individual 
autonomy. Where my own historical work will focus on the varying ways in 
which the Dutch state has negotiated these tensions, Johanne’s comparative 
sociological work will study the relationship between state regulation and 
experienced norms within differing national contexts. Finally, Jill’s 
ethnographic work, in focussing on the lived experiences of migrants, will place 
the tensions under study in a global context. She will moreover bring 
transnational normative fields into the equation, placing national state regulation 
in yet another light. Through daily conversations and monthly walks, we can 
confront each other with our respective disciplinary strengths and weaknesses 
and our varying perspectives. In this way, the project as a whole seeks to reflect 
the strength of law as a discipline, namely its constant exposure of argument to 
counter-argument in its never ending search for the most convincing one.63
 Recently we launched a website to report on our research project. In the 
course of the coming years, we shall be holding numerous seminars and 
organising two conferences. As our project becomes more solidly enmeshed in 
an expanding world wide web of researchers and practitioners, the possibilities 
for further research will become enriched in ways that, at this point, are 
impossible to predict. The broader context in which migration law regulates 
processes of inclusion and exclusion will moreover continue to surprise us with 
unexpected changes in policy and jurisprudence, raising new issues and solving 
old ones. But one thing I do know. As long as people choose to engage in family 
life, as long as people stay on the move, and as long as the nation remains the 
chief unit of political organisation, intimate strangers will continue to confront 
us with the tensions and contradictions inherent to the regulation of human 
mobility.  
 
 
Words of thanks  
 
Speaking of processes of interdependency and intersubjectivity – research is 
certainly one of them. Without the help of many others, I could not stand here 
today. My thanks to the Board of Directors of the VU University and 
Hogeschool Windesheim, and to that of the law faculty, for my appointment. 
Particular thanks to the department of constitutional and administrative law, for 
                                                 
63 C.f. Sanne Taekema, ‘Relative Autonomy. A Characterization of the Discipline of Law’, in: Bart   
van Klink & Sanne Taekema (eds.), Law and Method, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2011, p. 33-52; B. 
Latour, La fabrique du droit, Paris: La Découverte, 2002. 
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offering me a permanent position here so that I could set root as a researcher and 
develop my line of enquiry. My thanks as well to the Netherlands Organisation 
for Scientific Research, NWO, that provided grants at crucial moments! 
A very special thanks to my colleagues at the Migration Law Section. 
Together we have managed to generate an environment of enthusiasm, 
inspiration and professional rigor that in my experience is very unusual and is 
truly priceless. Without you as an intellectual community, I could never have 
succeeded in pulling in those grants! And thanks to Maja Grcic and her 
colleagues at the subsidy desk. I have had experience applying for grants with 
and without their support, and believe me, their guidance makes a world of 
difference.  
Nadia, Younous, Johanne and Jill – we are already off to a great start. It 
has been exciting to see how all of you have moulded your research questions to 
match your own interests and talents – and to see how you yourselves have 
grown as researchers and academics just these past nine months. If you have 
learnt half as much as I have, then that in itself is cause for celebration. I very 
much look forward to continuing our journey together in the years ahead.  
Colleagues of the department of administrative and constitutional law: I 
have always felt very at home in this department and especially appreciate the 
well-maintained tradition of lunching together and holding spontaneous happy 
hours at the end of the week – even if I have been a very poor participant during 
this past year. I promise to better myself on that score! And a big hug for Els. 
Whatever will become of us when you retire? 
Man, Nell and Eric – it’s so great to have you here. Speaking of 
transnational family ties – what more is there to say? 
Last but not least, my Boys: Ruud, Cees, Ewout. Here I reach the point of 
saying what, in the words of the Danish grooks writer Piet Hein, is easier done 
than said. 
 
Honoured Rector, honoured guests, it’s time I wrap up. I thank you all for your 
attention. 
 
I have spoken. Ik heb gezegd. 
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In politiek-filosofische discussies over het migratierecht worden doorgaans de 
individuele rechten van de vreemdeling geplaatst tegenover het algemene belang 
van de natie. Hiermee wordt echter een belangrijk gegeven over het hoofd 
gezien, namelijk dat de vreemdeling meestal geen vreemde is voor de nationale 
samenleving. De helft van de vreemdelingen die om toelating vragen tot 
Nederland zijn (huwelijks)partners, kinderen of ouders van Nederlanders of in 
Nederland gewortelde migranten. Ook mensen die migreren voor werk of voor 
asiel, vertrekken meestal naar een land waar zij al familie hebben wonen.  
 Ons wereldbeeld bepaalt hoe we over het migratierecht denken. Wij zijn 
gewend de wereld te verbeelden als een soort lappendeken: ieder land een apart 
lapje, met zijn eigen karakter en geschiedenis. Maar we kunnen ons de wereld 
ook anders voorstellen, bijvoorbeeld als de kaart waarmee een 
vliegmaatschappij zijn vluchten toont – geen lappendeken maar een netwerk van 
verbindingen. Deze twee wereldbeelden staan haaks op elkaar, en toch zijn ze 
beiden even valide. Voor een rechtvaardige en doeltreffende regulering van 
migratie, is het van belang beiden tot hun recht te laten komen.  
Jurisprudentie over het recht op respect voor het gezinsleven vertolkt een 
alternatief perspectief dat grensoverschrijdende  familiebanden voorop stelt, in 
plaats van deze te veronachtzamen. In mijn onderzoek bouw ik voort op deze 
ontwikkeling, door familieverhoudingen steeds centraal te stellen, niet alleen bij 
gezinshereniging, maar ook bij arbeidsmigratie en asiel. Om te waken tegen 
eenzijdigheid van mijn kant, betrek ik hierbij onderzoekers uit verschillende 
disciplines, en tracht ik ruimte te scheppen voor de concurrerende perspectieven 
van individu, familie en staat. 
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